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The authors discuss a corporate governance crisis in Hong Kong involving the
investigation of insolvent companies. Over the last decade the rates paid to
insolvency practitioners to handle "summary cases" in liquidation has been
steeply declining. At the current rate of HK$2,558 per case, it is not possible
to undertake a proper investigation of the insolvent company. To address this
problem, the authors propose that the government consider establishing a special
investigations unit.
Introduction
Government officials are frequently heard extolling the virtues of good cor-
porate governance, whilst stressing Hong Kong's credentials in this regard.
Therefore, it may come as a surprise to learn that the government has for a
number of years been presiding over an increasingly obvious corporate gov-
ernance debacle. This undermining of Hong Kong's corporate governance
credentials concerns the proper investigation of businesses that go into in-
solvent liquidation.
For the government apparently believes that in a typical case a subsidy
of HK$2,558 per case is sufficient to ensure that a full investigation of an
insolvent company's affairs and, in particular, the conduct of its directors,
will be conducted. Yes, HK$2,558 is the going rate for private insolvency
practitioners to agree to undertake an in-depth statutory investigation - in
a jurisdiction that has some of the highest professional fees in the world! No
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wonder there is a growing body of opinion that government policies are help-
ing dodgy directors get away with (corporate) murder.
Investigation of Insolvent Companies
Limited liability, as any lawyer, accountant or business student can tell you,
is a pillar of the modem commercial environment. The distinct advantage
of limited liability is, of course, that it enables controlling directors / share-
holders to run all aspects of a company's business without thereby exposing
themselves to liability for the debts of the company should it go bust. The
price to be paid for this benefit has always been a level of public disclosure
and scrutiny.
Where a company goes under and is liquidated, it follows that there has
to be an appropriate level of investigation to ensure that any directors who
have cheated creditors, or otherwise breached the law, will be brought to
book. Because Hong Kong inherited UK company law, so too Hong Kong
used to follow the UK model for investigations. Namely, that the Official
Receiver (a government official) would in most cases be appointed to con-
duct the administration of a company in compulsory liquidation.
Liquidation involves collecting in all the company's assets, settling a list
of creditors to whom any dividend might eventually be paid and, of great-
est importance, investigating the causes of failure and the conduct of the
directors. A proper investigation takes time and resources - it is expen-
sive. The figures given in the Audit Commission Report on the Official
Receiver's Office (March 2000) indicate that roughly HK$80,000 was the
average cost to government of each liquidation when these were conducted
in-house. Not surprisingly, therefore, the government has sought to con-
tract out liquidation work in an effort to save costs.
Contracting Out Summary Cases
Contracting out liquidation work is relatively straightforward in the big
insolvency cases. Because the company has substantial assets, the liquida-
tor knows that his fees (charged on a time cost basis) and expenses will
be paid out of those assets (in particular before any money is paid out to
creditors). But in small cases, where there are no or virtually no assets
left by the time a liquidator steps in, the difficult question is how will a
liquidator drawn from the private sector get remunerated? This is a par-
ticularly pressing question because over 90% of all liquidations in Hong
Kong are small asset cases - these are referred to under the Companies
Ordinance as "summary cases". Moreover, in 85% of all summary cases
there will in effect be zero assets.
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When the Government first started contracting out summary cases, in
1997, it paid a maximum fee of HK$60,000 to a private sector liquidator:
which was a significant saving on the government's previous in-house costs.
The fee was reduced in 1999 to $40,000. Thereafter a tender system -
now known as Panel T - was introduced. Under Panel T, firms of (usually)
accountants or solicitors submit "bids" specifying the extent of the subsidy
they will require to handle batches of for example 20 or 100 summary
liquidations. The bid sets out, in effect, what the firm will charge the gov-
ernment to handle each case assuming that there are no realisations from
which to meet their fees. The government, as one would expect, accepts
the lowest bids.
The following Table sets of the average tender price for the exercises
during the period 2001-2008:*
Year Average Price in HK$
2001 16,585
2002 11,200
2003 9,200
2004/5 5,500
2006/7 3,100
2008/9 2,558
From 2004, the tender has been conducted every two years.
The lowest successful bid in the March 2008 exercise was HK$41,850 for an
estimated batch of 93 cases - amounting to an average amount of a mere
HK$450 per case; whilst the highest successful bid was HK$288,300 - an
average amount of HK$3,100. Thus, the highest bid in 2008 amounted to
the average levels overall in 2006/7, and the average figure in 2008, taking
all successful bids into account, fell to an all-time low of HK$2,558. The
government might look at these figures and see them as evidence of a great
success - in terms of cutting its costs from HK$80,000 to HK$2,558 per
case. But a liquidation, even in a summary case, ought to require many tens
of hours of work from the liquidator and his team. How else can a proper
investigation, as required by the Companies Ordinance, be carried out?
Government Policies Create Moral Hazard
In the language of corporate governance, there is a significant "moral haz-
ard" presented to a private liquidator in a Panel T case. Take the all too
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familiar scenario where there is some evidence that the directors, with the
assistance of a number of friends and relatives, have ripped off the company
and its creditors. However, let us assume that some of the directors have
already disappeared and the chances of actually recovering assets (out of
which the liquidator might be able to recover some of his time costs) are at
best very slim.
A proper investigation ought to be conducted to discover: (i) which
directors were involved; (ii) what actually happened to the company's as-
sets; and (iii) the role of the implicated friends and relatives. But let us say
that such an investigation would require an estimated minimum of 80 bill-
able hours of work, as well as the incurring of considerable out-of-pocket
expenses by the liquidator. However, there is no prospect of recovering
those expenses, let alone being paid for any of the billable hours. Surely,
it is laughable to suggest that a private liquidator can be expected to give
away so much of his own time and money in such a scenario. A HK$2,558
subsidy is patently absurd.
Unscrupulous Directors
In addition, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that unscrupulous
directors are aware of the realities in relation to the investigation of sum-
mary cases. Such directors are being encouraged, in effect, to make sure
that they spend, take or otherwise run down their company's assets to
the lowest possible level before the company goes into liquidation. Why
leave the company with HK$500,000, which can later be used to fund a
thorough investigation by the liquidator, when if that money has already
been dissipated, the company will fall into the "bargain basement" inves-
tigation category?
Many Insolvency Practitioners have stories of being consulted by direc-
tors of insolvent companies that have little or no prospect of recovery. In
many of these situations, an immediate liquidation would result in a divi-
dend for creditors. However, the directors frequently ignore the advice of
the Insolvency Practitioner and continue trading at a loss - with the com-
pany eventually being wound up with no assets and therefore no funds with
which to fund an investigation.
Government Inactivity
Concerns as to low levels of investigations in insolvency cases were an is-
sue even as long ago as 2002, when the government appointed a consultant
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to review the role of the Official Receiver's Office. The consultant high-
lighted the general perception that insufficient resources were devoted to
insolvency investigations. The consultant recommended that a specialist
investigations unit should be established by the government to ensure that
the more complex Panel T cases were thoroughly investigated. This recom-
mendation received broad public support in the consultation exercise that
followed publication of the consultant's report.
Not only has the government not set up a specialist investigations unit,
it has in fact allowed the situation to deteriorate drastically by presiding
over the current tender arrangements, which have resulted in a system
where $2,558 is supposed to be sufficient to fund a proper investigation.
The Way Forward
The manner in which no asset cases are now contracted out in Hong
Kong is unique, as far as the authors are aware. No precedent is to be
found in England, Australia or the United States. The Panel T arrange-
ments were initially put in place at a time of severe economic recession
in Hong Kong. Whilst everyone is in favour of reducing unnecessary
government expenditure, the Panel T system threatens to undermine the
credibility of the whole insolvency process. The faults of the current sys-
tem are glaring - any system that encourages directors to dissipate assets
in the run up to the commencement of formal insolvency proceedings is
fatally flawed.
No new laws are required. It is simply a question of proper enforcement
of the existing laws via appropriate administrative arrangements. There is
no need to go back to the pre-1997 position, when all no asset cases were
handled in-house by the Official Receiver's Office. But, if some sort of
tender process is to be retained, the Consultant's recommendation for the
establishment of a specialist investigations unit will have to be given the
most serious consideration. We already know, from the work of the inter-
departmental task force set up to combat insolvency abuse in the catering
sector, that proper enforcement may lead to widespread changes of behav-
iour by directors. There is every reason to think that a similar commitment
from the government can rescue the Hong Kong insolvency regime from its
current crisis.

